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A. MAXIMS AND PRINCIPLES
Consider three well-known Latin maxims in the Scots law of transfer:
(i) nemo plus juris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse haberet
(ii) assignatus utitur jure auctoris
(iii) tantum et tale.
The fi rst is a basic principle of property law. A transferor cannot give a better right 
to the transferee than he had himself.1 The second is said to be peculiar to the law 
of assignation:2 the debitor cessus can raise all defences against the assignee that 
he could have raised against the cedent.3 The third maxim is seen to be a principle 
*  I would like to thank Peter Webster and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.
1 The principle is elementary and probably older than the classical Roman law where it was thus formu-
lated: D 50.17.54; D 20.1.3.1. See also J Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas, 2nd edn (1707, transl P 
Gane 1956) 20.6.8. In Scotland, and indeed in England, the same principle is often expressed as nemo 
dat quod non habet.  
2 Scottish Widows Fund v Buist (1876) 3 R 1078 at 1082 per Lord President Inglis; Scottish Law Commis-
sion, Consultative Memorandum on Defective Consent and Consequential Matters (Scot Law Com CM 
No 42, 1978) para 3.137.
3 Robertson v Wright (1873) 1 R 237 at 243 per Lord Ardmillan; G Watson (ed), Bell’s Dictionary and 
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of insolvency law: the creditors cannot have any greater right than the debtor. Are 
these maxims helpful? The fi rst principle is core to the transfer of property. Yet 
it is formulated negatively. That the transferee cannot have a better right than 
his author is interesting; but it is surely as important to know what rights the 
transferee acquires as what rights he does not.4 The assignatus principle applies 
to the tripartite situation involved in the transfer of a claim. But the maxim has 
been applied to transfers of land,5 and, shorn of the “assignatus” prefi x – as it was 
originally in Scots law6 – the maxim may be applied generally to all transfers: the 
transferee takes jure auctoris, he exercises the rights of his author.7 This is but 
a positive formulation of nemo plus.8 Similarly, although tantum et tale tends to 
be used only where creditors are involved9 (such as to describe the rights of an 
arrester10 or other judicial assignee,11 or the position of a trustee in sequestration), 
it has also been employed to describe the effect of a voluntary assignation.12 
The same principles that regulate the transfer of real rights regulate the transfer 
of personal rights. The only difference is in formulation. What is more conten-
tious, however, is whether the principles which regulate voluntary transfers also 
apply to transfers which occur by force of law. There are no reasons in principle 
why there should be differences. But if some authorities were taken at face value, 
a more complicated and perhaps unintelligible picture would emerge. With Lord 
Digest of the Law of Scotland, 7th edn (1890) 74; J Trayner, Latin Maxims and Phrases 4th edn (1894, 
reprinted 1986 and 1993) 53.
4 Cf P Birks, “Defi nition and division: a meditation on Institutes 3.13”, in P Birks (ed), Classifi cation of 
Obligations (1997) 1.
5 Governors of Heriot’s Trust v Caledonian Railway Company 1915 SC (HL) 52 at 62 per Lord Dunedin. 
Feudalism provided a tripartite relationship that made the assignatus maxim attractive.
6 Eg Stair, Inst, 3rd edn, by J Gordon and W Johnstone (1759) 1.10.16. There is no mention of the maxim 
even in abbreviated form in the fi rst or second editions of Stair. The textual variations were the subject 
of full argument in Scottish Widows Fund v Buist (1876) 3 R 1078. Cf Bankton, Inst 3.1.8. The fi rst 
reference to the full maxim, “assignatus utitur jure auctoris”, traced by the writer is relatively late: Irvin 
v Osterbye (1755) Mor 1,715 at 1,716, 6 March 1755 FC. The fi rst institutional writer to refer to the 
full assignatus maxim is Erskine, Inst 3.5.10. Erskine’s Institute was fi rst published, posthumously, in 
1773.
7 Cf H Jackson (ed), Latin for Lawyers (1915, reprinted 2000) 127, no 77.
8 Cf K G C Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland (1996) (henceforth Reid, Property) para 660: “The 
assignatus utitur rule has no general application in property law but is confi ned to the transfer by assigna-
tion of personal rights”. Compare J S Muirhead, An Outline of Roman Law (1937) 150 and Redfearn v 
Sommervails (1805) 5 Pat 707 at 710 per Lord Bannatyne, viewing assignatus as synonymous with nemo 
plus.
9 J Graham Stewart, Law of Diligence (1898) 128, 620 ff; Greenlees v Port of Manchester Insurance Co 
Ltd 1933 SC 383 at 400 per Lord Justice-Clerk Alness; Cheltenham & Gloucester plc v Sun Alliance & 
London Insurance plc 2001 SLT 347; Aitken v Independent Insurance Co 2001 SLT 376 at para 4 per 
Lord Macfadyen. 
10 See the arguments for the defender in McCubbins v Ferguson (1715) Mor 10,215 at 10,216.
11 Chamber’s JF v Vertue (1893) 20 R 257. 
12 Gairdners v Royal Bank of Scotland 22 June 1815 FC per Lord President Hope. Cf Livingstone v Allan 
(1900) 3 F 233.
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Rodger’s speech in Burnett’s Tr v Grainger13 comes an opportunity to clarify many 
of the problems that surround the rules of competition. Some of the confusion is 
attributable to the Scots lawyer’s focus on Latin maxims rather than underlying 
legal principle;14 but much stems simply from inherent complexity. The topics 
involved are notoriously diffi cult: fraud, trusts, diligence and insolvency. When Lord 
Meadowbank encountered this subject, he cautioned, “I am afraid to speak of this 
case with too much confi dence. It goes deep into principle.”15 He was not wrong.
B. FRAUD AND TRANSFER
Scots law has a wide and general principle of fraud. As McBryde points out, fraud 
is an example of where damages in delict are available for pure economic loss.16 
Erskine describes fraud as “any machination or contrivance to deceive”.17 With 
such breadth and fl exibility, however, comes imprecision. In the case of a double 
sale, for example, the transferee’s knowledge of prior rights has been labelled “bad 
faith”. And bad faith has been equated with fraud. But is the transferee’s fraud 
really the same as the fraud of the person transferring to him, which was crimi-
nalised by the Stellionate Act of 1540?18 Stellionate was perpetrated by the seller, 
not the buyer.19 Similarly the rules regarding the preservation of a bankrupt’s assets 
for the benefi t of his creditors are linked to fraud. The actio Pauliana no doubt 
developed from the painful experience of desperate debtors vergens ad inopiam 
dissipating their assets to friends and family with a view to frustrating the claims 
of lawful creditors.20 Yet dispositions made in good faith could still be considered 
13 [2004] UKHL 8, 2004 SC (HL) 19.
14 A Rodger, “The use of Civil Law in the Scottish courts”, in D L Carey Miller and R Zimmermann 
(eds), The Civilian Tradition in Scots Law (1997) 225 at 234-235. That said, Latin is usually a language 
particularly suited to articulating legal ideas. In the twenty-fi rst century, while the decline of Latinity 
may be understandable, the attack on its use in the courts by those who should know better is not; in 
Lord Rodger’s words it is “not only patronising but simplistic”: see “A time for everything under the law: 
some refl ections on retrospectivity” (2005) 121 LQR 57 at 66.
15 Redfearn v Sommervails (1805) 5 Pat 707, Mor “Personal and Real” App No 3, sub nom Sommervails v 
Redfearn 22 November 1805 FC. Lord Meadowbank’s opinion is only to be found in Paton’s report of 
the appeal to the House of Lords in 1813: (1813) 5 Pat 707 at 710.
16 W W McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland, 2nd edn (2001) (henceforth McBryde, Contract) para 
14-73.
17 Erskine, Inst 3.1.16.
18 APS, c 23; 12mo, c 105.
19 See R G Anderson, “Offside goals before Rodger Builders” 2005 JR 277.
20 The classic text is J A Ankum, De Geschiedenis der Actio Pauliana (1962). There is much to be gained 
from this seminal work. It was recently cited to the Privy Council in a Jersey Appeal, Snell v Beadle 
[2001] UKPC 5, [2001] 2 AC 304, where the opinion of the Board was given by Lord Hope of Craighead. 
See too In re Esteems Settlement [2002] JLR 53. It is to be regretted that Ankum did not consider Scots 
law in his companion work, De Pauliana buiten Faillissement in het Nederlandse Recht sedert de Codi-
fi catie (1962). English law is briefl y mentioned.
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fraudulent. Take the genuine gift. No motive is apparent other than love, favour 
and affection. But, if the donor quickly becomes bankrupt, such a gratuitous alien-
ation is deemed fraudulent,21 the fraud being perpetrated against creditors who 
are entitled to exact their dues from the bankrupt’s assets. 
If this were not enough, we must also observe the complex historical develop-
ment of the effect of fraud on transfer. In modern law, fraud is a vice of consent 
and not a real vice: “Fraud is no vitium reale affecting the subject but only the 
committer of the fraud and those who are partakers of the fraud”.22 It does not, 
therefore, transmit against onerous singular successors.23 The position in Roman 
law and in the jus commune, which was infl uential in Scotland,24 is more confused. 
The post-Justinianic Civil Law distinguished fraud giving rise to the contract25 and 
incidental fraud.26 This the medieval lawyers distilled from a passage by Ulpian.27 
If the contract was one bonae fi dei as opposed to stricti juris, fraud giving rise to 
the contract rendered it null.28 In contracts stricti juris either the actio de dolo or 
the exceptio doli was available, irrespective of the type of fraud.29 Fraud giving 
rise to the contract also prevented property from passing, and the defrauded party 
could still vindicate.30
At one time this post-Justinianic view was widely held,31 especially by those who 
required a valid underlying causa for transfer.32 It was not without its problems. In 
the fi rst place, it proceeded on a distinction which has no counterpart in modern 
law, viz between contracts bonae fi dei and contracts stricti juris.33 Secondly, no 
21 Bankton’s strikingly modern phrase is, “statutory presumptive fraud”: Bankton Inst 1.10.85. 
22 Stair, Inst 1.9.15; Reid, Property para 616 (W M Gordon).
23 Stair, Inst 1.9.10, 4.35.19; New Mining and Exploring Syndicate v Chalmers and Hunter 1912 SC 126; 
Clydesdale Bank v Paul (1877) 4 R 626; Gibbs v British Linen Co (1875) 4 R 630.
24 See eg Schuurmans & Sons v Goldie (1828) 6 S 1110 at 1113 per Lord Alloway; but compare Lord 
Justice-Clerk Boyle and Lord Glenlee at 1114-1115.
25 Dolus dans causam contractui: J Trayner, Latin Maxims (n 3) 68. Cf R J Pothier, Traité des obligations 
(1761) § 31.
26 Dolus incidens in contractum.
27 D 4.3.7.pr. See R Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations (1990) 667 ff; L van Vliet, “Iusta causa tradi-
tionis and its history in European private law” (2003) European Review of Private Law 342 at 350; N 
Whitty, “Indirect enrichment in Scots Law” 1994 JR 200 and 239 esp at 256 ff.
28 See Zimmermann, Obligations 662 ff. The Civil Law position is recounted by Lord Brougham in 
Attwood v Small (1838) 6 Cl & Fin 232 at 444-445, (1835-40) 7 ER 684 at 764. 
29 Zimmermann, Obligations 663. The absence of the exceptio doli in modern South African law was only 
determined by the Appellate Division in Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 (3) 
SA 580 (A).
30 Allan Stewart & Co v Creditors of James Stein (1788) Mor 4,949 and 14,218, Hailes 1059. See, in 
particular, Lord Monboddo’s opinion. The case was reversed on appeal but this understanding of fraud 
was not doubted.
31 For example by Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas (n 1) 4.3.3.
32 These are discussed in George Joseph Bell’s posthumously published work, Inquiries into the Contract 
of Sale of Goods and Merchandise (1844) 120 ff.
33 Both Stair, Inst 1.10.11 and Bankton Inst 1.11. 20, 22 observe that the peculiarities of Roman contract 
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distinction was made between vices of consent and real vices.34 Yet to charac-
terise fraud as a real vice is impractical: commerce would be impeded. Thirdly, 
much depended on justa causa. The role accorded to this doctrine varies from 
legal system to legal system and views may vary in any one legal system, as in 
Scotland.35 Fourthly, conduct which might be labelled fraudulent in the civil courts 
might not be criminal (and perhaps vice versa).36 Fifthly, conduct that would now 
be described as undue infl uence,37 negligent misrepresentation, force and fear,38 
facility and circumvention39 or bad faith40 have all been treated as “fraud” in earlier 
Scots law.
Sources referring to fraud and its effect on purchasers and creditors must, 
therefore, be approached with caution. Is the fraud genuine? When was the case 
decided? Was it decided at a time when the prevailing view was that fraud was a 
real vice? This vague notion of fraud translated into vague appeals to the tantum 
et tale maxim.
C. BURNETT’S TR v GRAINGER
The facts of Burnett’s Tr v Grainger41 are well-known. Heritable property was 
sold. The seller delivered a disposition. The disposition remained unrecorded for 
some fi fteen months. In the interim the seller was sequestrated and the trustee 
recorded a notice of title. The question was whether both the heritage and the 
price were available to the seller’s creditors. On general principles of property 
law the answer was in the affi rmative. But the controversial decision in Sharp 
v Thomson,42 on one interpretation, clouded what was once clear. In Burnett’s 
law were not adopted in Scots law, though they do not explicitly advert to the Roman distinction. Cf 
Estate Schickerling v Schickerling 1936 CPD 269 at 275-276.
34 Cf McBryde, Contract para 13-08: “In relation to nullities the early Scots lawyers were practical. There 
was no point in attacking a transaction as null, if the implementation of the transaction was not also 
invalidated”.
35 The prevailing view is that the doctrine is not part of Scots law: D L Carey Miller with D Irvine, 
Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law, 2nd edn (2005) paras 8.08 ff; Reid, Property paras 611 and 612. But 
compare McBryde, Contract paras 13-01 ff.
36 See generally B Gill, The Crime of Fraud: A Comparative Study (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
Edinburgh, 1975), esp ch 12. Cf Muir Wood and Co v Moore and Kidd (1869) Guthrie’s Sheriff Court 
Reports vol 1, 444 at 445 per Sheriff Guthrie: “[I]t cannot affect the question of civil right in this case 
that [the alleged fraudster] suffered a punishment on his own confession as for breach of trust”.
37 Wright and Ritchie v Murray (1746) Mor 4,952.
38 See J E du Plessis, “Force and Fear”, in K G C Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private 
Law in Scotland (2000) vol 2, 101 at 118-119; J E du Plessis, Compulsion and Restitution (Stair Society 
vol 51, 2004).
39 Anderson v Spence (1683) Mor 10,286; Allison v Bothwell (1696) Mor 4,954.
40 See Morison’s Dictionary, s v “Bona et Mala Fides”.
41 2004 SC (HL) 19.
42 1997 SC (HL) 66.
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Tr the sheriff principal adopted the view, deriving from Sharp, that “property” 
equals “benefi cial interest”.43 On appeal, the Inner House distinguished Sharp 
and adhered to general principle,44 and this view prevailed in the House of Lords. 
The property was held to be available for division among the seller’s unsecured 
creditors. The content of the speeches varied. The English judges appeared 
perplexed by the idea of undivided dominium that prevails in Scotland and, for 
that matter, throughout much of Europe. The Scottish Law Lords, Lords Hope 
and Rodger, gave speeches that were, to some extent, unexpected. For present 
purposes, it is Lord Rodger’s speech that is of interest. His Lordship approached 
the question from the perspective of knowledge of prior rights and, in particular, 
the effect of such knowledge on creditors. This question is intimately linked with 
the tantum et tale doctrine; one much debated, and perhaps much misunderstood, 
in the Scottish sources. 
Lord Rodger’s speech is veritable tour de force. This note cannot do it justice. 
The results of his analysis are, generally, to be welcomed. Lord Rodger identifi es 
with admirable clarity the guiding principle, one which, hitherto, had not been 
properly articulated: 45
 And it is because [the trustee in sequestration] is treated as an adjudging creditor, and 
not merely as a purchaser, of the debtor’s heritable estate that the trustee can set out to 
destroy the rights of uninfeft purchasers of that estate by infefting himself before they 
do. A purchaser could not do this: Rodger (Builders) v Fawdry 1950 SC 583. 
“The requirement of good faith”, he adds later, “applies only to purchasers”. 46
D. TRUSTEES IN SEQUESTRATION
The act and warrant awarded to a trustee in sequestration is but a collective diligence 
for the benefi t of the bankrupt’s creditors. In Burnett’s Tr, Lord Rodger went to 
considerable trouble to trace the development of the tantum et tale principle and 
its effect on diligence creditors. As he pointed out, there has been considerable 
oscillation of views in respect of the trustee in sequestration’s position.47 
43 2000 SLT (Sh Ct) 116.
44 2002 SC 580.
45 2004 SC (HL) 19 at para 111. Cf Lord Hope’s speech at para 26.
46 At para 144.
47 With the result that many cases faced with competing claims struggle to identify a proper basis on which 
to proceed: see, for example, Halifax plc v Gorman’s Tr 2000 SLT 1409. Even that great protagonist of 
equity in Scots law, Lord Kames, would not have gone as far as some of the dicta in the Halifax case. As 
Kames himself observed in a competition case: “I cannot discover in the laws of any country, that equity 
has been carried so far. And it would make a great innovation in law that has not been dreamed of”: Duke 
of Norfolk v Annuitants of York Buildings Company (1752) Kames Sel Dec 1 at 2, (1752) Mor 7,062 at 
7,063, Elchies, Competition No 12.
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Bona fi de purchasers cannot be prejudiced by their author’s fraud. If, therefore, 
a trustee in sequestration were viewed as a bona fi de purchaser, the position would 
be clear: the assets transferred to the trustee would not be affected by the fraud 
of the bankrupt.48 But some pre-Burnett sources did not recognise creditors to be 
in such a position. There are numerous dicta to the effect that, because he takes 
tantum et tale, a trustee in sequestration “cannot have a greater right than the 
bankrupt”.49 At one time tantum et tale was referred to as a “general principle”.50 
Later the principle was said not to be different from maxims invoked to describe 
other transfers.51 This was followed by the somewhat arbitrary assertion that the 
doctrine applies only to moveables.52 It is therefore not surprising that some 
writers are careful never to use the term. Others, however, use it freely;53 and, 
on one view, tantum et tale plays a central role in the Scots law of insolvency.54 
Often the maxim is employed in situations that could equally be governed by the 
brocards nemo plus or utitur jure auctoris; but there are also cases where tantum 
et tale is used in the specifi c sense that creditors cannot “take advantage”55 of the 
48 Edmund v Mags of Aberdeen (1855) 18 D 47 at 58 per Lord Deas. But compare Lord Deas’ lone dissent-
ing opinion in Wyper v Harveys (1861) 23 D 606 at 625 and his opinion in Watson v Duncan (1879) 6 
R 1247 at 1252.
49 Cf W W McBryde, Bankruptcy, 2nd edn (1995) (henceforth McBryde, Bankruptcy) paras 9-24-9-29. 
See too Watt v Finlay (1854) 8 D 529; Littlejohn v Black (1855) 18 D 207; Davidson v Boyd (1868) 7 M 
77 at 78 per Lord Kinloch; Dundee Calendering Co v Duff’s Tr (1869) 8 M 289 at 296 per Lord Deas; 
Abbott v Mitchell (1870) 8 M 791 at 794 per Lord Deas, 797 per Lord Kinloch; Forbes’ Tr v McLeod 
(1898) 25 R 1012 at 1015 per Lord McLaren; Lord Napier and Ettrick’s Tr v Lord de Saumarez (1899) 
1 F 614 at 618 per Lord President Robertson; National Bank of Scotland v City Commercial Restaurant 
(1902) 10 SLT 7 at 7 per Lord President Balfour; Paul’s Trs v Paul 1912 2 SLT 61; Campbell v Carphin 
1925 SLT (Sh Ct) 30.
50 Thomson v Douglas Heron & Co (1786) Mor 10,229 and 10,299, sub nom Thomson v Creditors of 
Armstrong (1786) Hailes 1002.
51 Mansfi eld v Walker’s Tr (1835) 1 Sh & McL 203 at 339 per Lord Brougham.
52 Watson v Duncan (1879) 6 R 1247 at 1252 per Lord Deas. But cf Heritable Reversionary Co Ltd v Miller 
(1891) 18 R 1166 at 1170 per Lord Adam.
53 For a recent example, see Jackson v Laurieston Homes (Howwood) Ltd [2005] CSOH 7, 2005 GWD 
10-146. It is perhaps no coincidence that, in some of the more controversial cases in Scots insolvency law 
(especially those dealing with the interaction between trusts and insolvency), repetitions of the tantum 
et tale mantra reverberate: Heritable Reversionary Co Ltd v Miller (1891) 18 R 1166 rev (1892) 19 R 
(HL) 43; Smith v Liquidator of James Birrell Ltd 1968 SLT 174; Sharp v Thomson 1994 SC 512 at 503, 
521 per Lord Penrose.
54 R Rennie, “The race to the registers revisited” (2005) 50 JLSS July/53; W W McBryde, Bankruptcy para 
9-24. In its Report on Bankruptcy and Related Aspects of Insolvency and Liquidation (Scot Law Com No 
68, 1981) para 11.22 the Scottish Law Commission described the tantum et tale rule as an “equitable and 
adaptable” principle and, more recently, the Commission has recommended the principle’s retention: 
Report on Diligence (Scot Law Com No 183, 2001) paras 3.70-3.71. 
55 Cf Colquhoun’s Trs v Campbell’s Trs (1902) 4 F 739 at 744 per Lord Kinnear: “There was a gross fraud, 
and the creditors cannot take advantage of it without making themselves art and part in the crime. It is 
a general rule of law and morals that nobody can wilfully take advantage of a fraud for his own benefi t 
without making himself particeps criminis, and therefore a trustee cannot claim for the creditors the 
advantage of a fraud of the bankrupt”. Compare the opinion of the same judge in Gamage Ltd v Char-
lesworth’s Trs 1910 SC 257 at 264. See too Sir George Mackenzie, Observations on the 28th Act of 23rd 
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bankrupt’s fraud. These cases require the defrauded creditor to be returned to his 
pre-fraud position without having to rank as an ordinary unsecured creditor. But 
fraud is a personal obligation. And a bankrupt debtor, by defi nition, cannot fulfi l 
his personal obligations. Preferring the fraud creditor over other personal credi-
tors is, therefore, quite arbitrary. What is given to one must be taken from many.
In some tantum et tale cases, it is unclear how the trustee in sequestration was 
viewed. If the “take advantage” cases are correct, the trustee cannot be a bona 
fi de onerous transferee. We can therefore sympathise with Lord Westbury who, 
when confronted with a Scotch appeal on the issue, characterised the trustee as 
a gratuitous alienee.56 That could not be correct. Unusually, three distinguished 
Scottish judges later criticised Lord Westbury’s speech. Two did so in the House 
of Lords,57 while the third was no less a fi gure than Lord President Inglis.58 Lord 
Westbury’s approach was, however, shared by one of the most gifted (if at times 
unreliable) jurists of the time, Lord McLaren.59 But whatever may be the correct 
category to place a trustee in sequestration, the trustee cannot be categorised as 
a gratuitous alienee. 
In a case not cited by the House of Lords in Burnett’s Tr, the First Division 
considered the position of a trustee in sequestration in some detail. The case is 
Parliament of James VI (1687) 100-102, quoted by Bell, Commentaries, 7th edn (1870) II, 184 n 4; M P 
Brown, Treatise on the Law of Sale (1821) para 599, IV: “[creditors] cannot lawfully profi t by the fraud 
of their debtor”. See too the cases cited in n 49 above.
56 Fleming v Howden (1868) 6 M (HL) 113 at 121.
57 Bank of Scotland v Hutchison, Main & Co 1914 SC (HL) 1 at 17 per Lord Shaw of Dunfermline, follow-
ing Lord Watson in Heritable Reversionary Co Ltd v Miller (1892) 19 R (HL) 43. J Burns, “English 
and Scottish bankruptcies” (1913) 29 LQR 460 at 462 confi dently ventured that “Certainly no Scottish 
lawyer can be got to subscribe to Lord Westbury’s dictum that a trustee in bankruptcy is only a ‘gratuitous 
alienee’.” Disapproval of Lord Westbury’s speech extends beyond his reference to “gratuitous alienee”. 
His suggestion that “an obligation to do an act with respect to property creates a trust” was described by 
Lorimer as “a hare whose course was devious and not to be followed”: see J C Lorimer, “Tantum et tale 
in Scots bankruptcy law” (1914) 26 JR 429 at 436. 
58 First, in Graeme’s Trs v Giersberg (1888) 15 R 691; and, again, on 14 July 1891, when he sat in his last 
week at the head of the First Division: Heritable Reversionary Co Ltd v Miller (1891) 18 R 1166 at 
1181-3. Lord Inglis died on 20th August 1891. His passing was noted by H Goudy in his critical note of 
the First Division’s decision at (1891) 3 JR 365. Though Goudy was complimentary as to Lord Inglis’ 
reasoning, at one and the same time he felt able to argue that the decision should be reversed by legisla-
tion. That legislation became unnecessary as a result of direct intervention by Goudy who, as counsel 
for the appellants in their successful appeal to the House of Lords, persuaded the House to reverse the 
Division: see (1892) 19 R (HL) 43.
59 Don’s Tr v Cameron (1885) 22 SLR 348 at 350; National Bank of Scotland v Dickie’s Tr (1895) 22 R 740 
at 754; Heritable Reversionary Co Ltd v Miller (1891) 18 R 1166 at 1173; Forbes’ Tr v McLeod (1898) 25 
R 1012 at 1015; Livingston v Allans (1900) 3 F 233 at 237-238. And see, in particular, William Morton & 
Co v Muir Bros 1907 SC 1211 at 1223: “Assuming a trustee in bankruptcy takes no higher right than that 
of a gratuitous alienee (which I take to be the meaning of the expression tantum et tale) was the trustee 
in this case affected by the condition …”; and at 1225: “I think it is perfectly clear that the trustee in 
bankruptcy is bound by any personal condition which limits the condition of the bankrupt”. See also the 
opinion attributed to Lord McLaren by J Burns in “English and Scottish bankruptcies” (1913) 29 LQR 
460 at 463 but which this writer has failed to trace.
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Graeme’s Trs v Giersberg.60 A Mrs Giersberg entered into an antenuptial marriage 
contract, which conveyed her whole estate, heritable and moveable, present and 
future, in trust, inter alia, for her aliment. Her brother, Patrick, was one of the 
trustees. Mrs Giersberg became entitled to a legacy. As a trustee, Patrick was 
obliged to ensure that the legacy was assigned in terms of the marriage contract. 
This required intimation of the assignation to the testator’s executors. But instead 
of intimating the assignation, Patrick arrested the legacy for debts allegedly due to 
him by Mrs Giersberg.61 He then became bankrupt. Patrick’s trustee in sequestra-
tion claimed the legacy. Mrs Giersberg argued that Patrick’s failure to intimate was 
a gross breach of trust from which the trustee could not benefi t. The question thus 
arose for decision: how was the trustee’s position to be characterised? Lord Presi-
dent Inglis refused to follow Lord Westbury’s view that a trustee in sequestration 
was a gratuitous alienee:62
The position of the trustee in sequestration does not seem to me to differ from that of 
any other assignee as regards a claim of this kind. The claim is in the nature of a nomen 
debiti – an incorporeal moveable right which passes by assignation – and therefore the 
trustee is in no better position than an onerous assignee … but I should only like to 
say that I am not inclined to go so far as Lord Westbury does [in Fleming v Howden] 
in describing the position of a trustee in a sequestration as being the same as that of a 
“gratuitous alienee”. I should rather put it in this way – that a trustee in sequestration is 
in no better position than an onerous assignee who has bought a debt.
Unfortunately there is no positive assertion that a trustee in sequestration is an 
onerous bona fi de transferee, only that he is no better than an onerous transferee. 
At best, this wording is an indication that a trustee in sequestration is not to be 
considered as different from an onerous bona fi de alienee. At worst, the dictum 
suggests that a trustee in sequestration is somewhere between a gratuitous trans-
feree and a bona fi de one.63 That is an unsatisfactory answer. It tells us nothing 
about the principles that should be applied on competition.
In the event, Lord Inglis came to the somewhat incongruous conclusion that, 
although the trustee was not a gratuitous alienee, he was subject to the debtor’s 
personal obligations: “If the bankrupt had used the arrestments he would have 
committed a breach of trust, and I do not think the trustee can do what would 
60 (1888) 15 R 691.
61 For the converse situation, where a creditor purports to arrest a claim against himself, see: R Kelbrick, 
“Malice in Wonderland” (2003) 66 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 232. With the 
exception of an earnings arrestment, it is not possible for an arrester to arrest in his own hands.
62 (1888) 15 R 691 at 694-695. 
63 This approach is taken by Lords Gillies, McKenzie, Medwyn and Corehouse in Mansfi eld v Walker’s Tr 
(1833) 11 S 813 at 822. See also McBryde, Bankruptcy para 9-24: “The principle remains that a trustee 
in bankruptcy cannot have the same rights as a bona fi de purchaser for value”.
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have constituted a breach of trust in the bankrupt”.64 Yet it is indisputable that an 
onerous bona fi de assignee (with which Lord Inglis, on one interpretation, groups 
a trustee in sequestration) would have been in an unimpeachable position. 
Lord Shand, in contrast, took the argument that a trustee is an onerous trans-
feree to its logical conclusion: 65
The right to raise action and do diligence for the recovery of debt is a legal incident of 
the right to the debt. It arises as a common law right in favour of all creditors against 
their debtors, and the pursuer [the trustee in sequestration] in using the arrestment in 
question is availing himself of that right only. Having an unqualifi ed right to the debt, 
why shall he be prevented from doing so? Because it is said that the bankrupt could not 
have effectually used an arrestment. The answer to that argument – an answer I humbly 
think sound – is this, that the objection to an arrestment by the bankrupt is personal – a 
personal bar which applies to him individually because of the duty or personal obliga-
tion which lay upon him …; but although he failed in his duty – and his failure might 
give rise to a claim of damages … – yet (1) this obligation in no way affects or binds the 
trustee for his creditors, who is not bound to fulfi l personal obligations of the bankrupt 
– least of all obligations arising out of the bankrupt holding the offi ce of a trustee; and 
(2) that the duty and obligation which affected and affect the bankrupt were not in any 
sense inherent qualifi cations of the right which the trustee in sequestration acquired 
under the Bankrupt Statute. So there is nothing to deprive him of the ordinary remedy 
of a creditor for recovery of his debt.
Lord Shand’s approach appears to this writer sound. It is also consistent with 
the leading case of Mansfi eld v Walker’s Trs66 and with later House of Lords 
authority.67 
E. ASSIGNEES: AN EXCEPTION?
In Burnett’s Tr, Lord Rodger states that while creditors need not, purchasers 
must, be in good faith.68 But that helpful principle does not directly address the 
purchaser’s position. What, precisely, are his rights? Assuming a purchaser is in 
good faith, can he take the object transferred free of the transferor’s personal 
obligations? In particular, is a good faith assignee subject to his author’s fraud?
The paradigm assignation involves three parties: cedent, assignee and debtor. 
It is still a transfer and as such should be subject to the general principles which 
affect all transfers. Admittedly, matters are complicated slightly because the object 
64 (1888) 15 R 691 at 695. It is implicit in this approach that if Patrick had simply not known of the bequest, 
or had failed to intimate or arrest, his creditors could have benefi ted. Cf Colquhoun’s Tr v Campbell’s Tr 
(1902) 4 F 739.
65 At 697. 
66 (1833) 11 S 813 affd (1835) 1 Sh & McL 203; sub nom Stewart’s Trs v Walker’s Trs 3 Ross LC 139.
67 Edmond v Gordon (1858) 3 Macq 116 at 131 per Lord Wensleydale. 
68 2004 SC (HL) 19 at para 144, discussed at C. above.
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of the transfer is a personal right, so that defences arising out of the relationship 
which gave birth to the claim being assigned may be raised by the debtor against 
any subsequent assignee. But vices (such as fraud) perpetrated by an assignee 
against a cedent are different. They give rise to personal obligations, but personal 
obligations that are unrelated to the personal rights which are the object of transfer. 
Fraudulent conduct which induces a transfer may render the transfer voidable. Or 
again, a transfer in breach of an obligation not to transfer may be voidable. Such 
voidability may be pled against the immediate transferee (subject to the require-
ments of the offside goals rule) but not against subsequent transferees. 
Nevertheless it has long been suggested that assignation of claims is excep-
tional: the claim of a defrauded fourth party (e.g. an earlier cedent in the transfer 
chain), it is argued, can be pled against even bona fi de onerous singular successors. 
Stair writes: 69
But in personal rights the fraud of authors is relevant against singular successors though 
not partaking or conscious of the fraud when they purchased; because assignees are but 
mere procurators, albeit in rem suam: and therefore they are in the same case with their 
cedents, except that their cedents’ oaths after they were denuded, cannot prejudge 
their assignees.
If, however, assignees are mere procurators, why does Stair describe the cedent as 
being “denuded”? The contradiction lays bare the incoherence of the procuratio 
analysis of assignation. Either claims can be transferred or they cannot. And in 
Scots law they can be; the language of procuratio being clothing and cosmetics. 
Stripped of that superfi cial exterior there is a concept of substance: the idea of 
transfer. 
Yet the procuratio analysis, outdated and artifi cial as it is, endures. Indeed the 
most recent exponent of the view that an assignation is nothing more than a procu-
ratio in rem suam is Lord Rodger himself.70 Such an approach is, with respect, 
unhelpful. Scots law never needed the procuratio analysis to explain assignation. 
Like French customary law, assignation or cession – i.e. outright transfer – had 
long been sanctioned. In making references to procuratio, Stair sought to bring 
the Scottish history into line with the Civilian history of cession. That treatment, 
however, was inconsistent with the existing body of Scots law. Bell, for example, 
strongly criticises Stair’s view.71 
Once it is accepted that assignation is a transfer (as it always has been in Scots 
law), then the position with regard to fraud should, in principle, be no different 
than with other assets. A transfer induced by fraud or made fraudulently may be 
69 Stair, Inst 4.40.21. See also Gosford’s report of Duff v Fowler (1672) Mor 10,282.
70 Caledonia North Sea Ltd v London Bridge Engineering 2000 SLT 1123 at 1140A. 
71 Bell, Commentaries, 2nd edn (1810) 150, note n; 3rd edn (1816) I, 182; 7th edn (1870) I, 303.
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voidable, but a reduction cannot affect subsequent onerous transferees. 
The history of fraud in Scots law has been charted by Professor McBryde.72 
For present purposes, however, attention can be focussed on a decision of 1772, 
McDonnells v Carmichael.73 D was indebted to A1. A1 assigned this claim to A2. 
A2 then assigned to A3. A3 was in good faith and gave value. A1 then sought to 
reduce the assignation he had granted to A2 on the basis of fraud. A3 claimed his 
position was unassailable. The pursuers pointed to the distinction between fraud 
giving rise to the assignation (dolus dans) and incidental fraud (dolus incidens). 
Fraud of the former type rendered the transfer null and void. The assignee, A3, it 
was argued, was thus unprotected.74 The fraud argument was typical for the times. 
It was a broad-axe approach. No distinction was made between void and voidable 
conveyances. Although multifarious conduct of a generally wrongful nature could 
amount to “fraud”, once that imperceptible line was crossed and the conduct 
labelled “fraudulent”, that, so to speak, was that. The fraud had to be undone and 
the whole transaction would be brought tumbling down. 
Such reasoning, however, is unsophisticated. It ignores a crucial fact: since the 
time when the assignation induced by fraud had been granted to A2, A2 had 
assigned to an onerous transferee, A3. No one would countenance A3 being preju-
diced if the transfer were of land or goods. The rationale would be that the effect 
on commerce would be catastrophic. Yet claims are more moveable and tradable 
than goods, to say nothing of land. Claims have considerable economic value. As a 
starting point, then, we would expect at least the same protection to be accorded 
72 Contract paras 14-93 to 14-101. See also W W McBryde, “Error”, in K G C Reid and R Zimmermann 
(eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland (2000) vol 2, 72. McBryde suggests that the court probably 
fi rst gave effect to the law as articulated by Stair in Burden v Whitefoord of Dunduff (1742) Elchies, 
Fraud No 11. This case, however, can only be fully understood in the light of Lord Pitfour’s opinion 
in McDonnells v Carmichael (1772) Mor 4,974, Hailes 513 (discussed in the text). Burden apparently 
involved a reduction of a disposition elicited from one Kennedy while he was drunk, “in so far as the 
property was not vested in a third party by infeftment”. Since the third party transferee was not infeft, 
there was no problem with reduction. There was no bona fi de onerous transferee. Although it was 
customary to refer to the holder of an unrecorded disposition as an “uninfeft proprietor”, such a descrip-
tion was a misnomer: an unregistered holder was not owner and could not become owner without regis-
tration. The other relevant case is Irvin v Osterbye (1755) Mor 1,715, but the facts are ambiguous.
73 (1772) Mor 4,974, Hailes 513.
74 Resolutio jure dantis resolvitur jus accepientis (the right of the giver having ceased or become void, the 
right of the receiver ceases also). This apparent principle was not an accurate statement of the law of 
transfer then, nor is it one now. The only detailed consideration of it is in Kilkerran’s report of Heron v 
Stewart and Hawthorn (1749) Mor 1,705, Kilkerran 389, Elchies, Fraud No 21, affd (1749) 1 Craigie, 
Stewart and Paton 432. But the court’s reasoning is not without its problems. The maxim is also invoked 
in Livingston v Menzies (1705) Mor 14,004; Sinclair v Shaw (1739) 5 Br Sup 658, Elchies, Arrestment 
No 11, Kilkerran 36; Countess of Moray v Stewart (1772) Mor 4,392; Elliot v Wilson 9 February 1826 
FC; Johnstone-Beattie v Dalzell (1868) 6 M 333 at 346 per Lord Ardmillan. Cf T Huc, Commentaire 
théorique et pratique du code civil (1894) vol VII, 299-300; P Malaurie and L Aynès, Droit civil: obliga-
tions, 11th edn (2001) vol 3, para 82.
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to onerous assignees of claims as to transferees of other assets. That assignees 
should receive less protection from extrinsic fraud is inexplicable. 
The court in McDonnells may have been alive to these concerns. On Stair’s 
view of assignation as a mere procuratio, however, the answer was clear: if each 
assignee was but a procurator – a representative – of the cedent, then it was readily 
understandable that any assignee, no matter how remote, would be subject to 
attack if any prior assignee had procured his transfer by fraud. So, in MacDonnells, 
the court granted reduction. Lord Kames, though not dissenting, was perplexed 
by the effect of the decision:75
The difference between the case of nomina debitorum and the other cases is this, and it 
is mentioned by Lord Stair, – An assignee is nothing else than a procurator in rem suam. 
Hence, in England, at this day, an assignee must pursue in the name of his cedent. With 
us an assignee is now held to have the total right. In that respect the law has changed. 
Why should not the effects of assignations also be changed? For want of this change, 
our law is, in one particular, a sort of hotch-potch; but we cannot help that.
Lord Kames’ protest that he “could not help” the decision is uncharacteristically 
deferential.76 It was a point he had investigated.77 He appreciated that, but for 
Stair, there was little basis for the procuratio theory of assignation in Scots law. 
On the contrary, there was a considerable strand of opinion that bona fi de onerous 
assignees took free from the claims of fourth parties. Although the authorities 
were not altogether consistent, the issues had been well and long appreciated. It 
was the analysis of assignation as a procuratio that was problematic. That analysis 
became orthodox only in 1681 when it was embossed with Stair’s seal of approval 
in the Institutions. 
There is, however, at least one detailed statement before 1681of the irrelevance 
of fourth party pleas to a bona fi de assignee. It is not widely known and may thus 
justify a lengthy quotation:78
But if he be an assignee for a cause onerous and not participes fraudis, knowing nothing 
of the back-bond, it is not easy to comprehend how the back-bond or trust can be 
75 Hailes 513 at 514. For decisions where extrinsic fraud affected a subsequent bona fi de assignee, see 
Monteith and his Factor v Captain Douglas and his Factor 8 November 1710, Forbes Dec; Wylie v 
Duncan (1803) Mor 10,269, 3 Ross LC 134 at 137 per Lord President Campbell.
76 Kames was not the last judge to baulk at contradicting Stair. Lord Dunedin’s speech in Carmichael v 
Carmichael’s Exx 1920 SC (HL) 195 is perhaps the best-known, and least-successful, attempt to recon-
cile what was decided with Stair’s stated opinion.
77 H Home, Lord Kames, Principles of Equity, 3rd edn (1825) 264.
78 Anent Trusts and Back-Bonds (1677) 3 Br Sup 185. The writer owes this reference to Professor Paisley: 
see M J de Waal and R R M Paisley, “Trusts”, in R Zimmermann, D Visser and K Reid (eds), Mixed Legal 
Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2005) 
846 n 224. It is not clear whether this is a report of a decided case. The report opens, “This case was 
started among the advocates…”. For a modern example where an alleged “back-letter” was pled against 
an assignee, see The Herald, 4 August 2003, 3 (“Pensioner to launch £1m action over ex-husband’s 
estate”).
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obtruded or declared against him, so as to clog his right; for what was there in law to 
put him in male fi de to bargain and contract with that person whom he found to have 
the sole and undoubted right of the lands or bond standing in his person? How could 
he without divination know it was only a trust, and that there was a back-bond; there 
having been no intimation of it [i.e. the trust] to him, no inhibition served upon it to put 
the lieges in male fi de, or to ascertain that there is such a thing? And if such latent deeds 
were regarded, there could be no commerce nor freedom in bargaining anent rights. 
Yea, though the back-bond was registrate, yet that cannot be esteemed a suffi cient 
intimation, since that registration is not necessitatis, but only “actus merae voluntatis”; 
and the lieges are not bound to search for it because there is no law enjoining the regis-
tration of such back-bonds as necessary, and so no law obliges one to take notice of him. 
Where a man gets an assignation to a bond and puts his assignation in the register, that 
will not be such an intimation as will hinder another party from taking a second assigna-
tion to that same bond and from being preferred if he intimate fi rst, notwithstanding the 
registration; for registration is not by our law a suffi cient way of intimation, unless where 
a special statute has declared and determined it shall be so, as in the case of registration 
of seasines [sic] by the Act of Parliament of 1617.
This analysis was advanced for its time. There is also little doubt that it was an 
analysis that was not universally accepted – as McDonnells v Carmichael shows. 
But it was the view that, correct in principle, was subsequently to prevail in the 
House of Lords in Redfearn v Sommervails.79 It is no coincidence that George 
Joseph Bell fi rst compared the relative claims of a bona fi de onerous assignee and 
a fourth party asserting a latent right only in the third edition of his Commentaries, 
published in 1816, shortly after the decision in Redfearn:80
Recollecting the principles upon which assignations were originally admitted, it will 
not appear wonderful that persons acquiring, by assignation, the rights to debts, and 
other jura incorporalia, should be considered as coming precisely into the place of 
the cedent, and as liable, of course, to all the personal exceptions pleadable against 
him. In that way arose the maxim, “assignatus utitur jure auctoris” which has so often 
been misunderstood, and held to imply a responsibility like that of an heir.[81] But this 
doctrine, in so far as it has been considered as applicable to any other exceptions than 
those competent to the debtor in defence against the claim, should not be held good 
in the present day, when the whole aspect of the law relative to assignations, is altered; 
and when, instead of being a mere procurator of the original creditor, the assignee is 
considered as a proper purchaser, holding a cessio in jure, as against the defender, the 
full jus obligationis, transferred by intimation as property is by delivery.
There is, then, no reason why a predecessor’s “fraud” should prejudice an 
onerous singular successor. There is also no reason to assume that Lord Rodger’s 
speech in Burnett was limited to the transfer of heritable property. Indeed the 
79 (1813) 1 Dow 50.
80 Commentaries, 3rd edn (1816) I, 184; 4th edn (1821) I, 223-224. By the fi fth edition (1826), as Bell 
developed his treatment, this had been relegated to a footnote: I, 284 n 2; see also McLaren’s edition, 
the seventh, of 1870: I, 302 n 5. 
81 Who would take, Bell might have said, tantum et tale! But the heir’s position requires consideration of 
the doctrine of universal succession.
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“seminal” case on which his argument was founded concerned an assignation.82 
Lord Rodger’s approach is unitary. He examines the principles of the law of 
diligence and their interaction with the law of transfer generally, irrespective of 
the nature of the asset being transferred. Assignations must not be viewed as 
exceptional for the law of transfer: indeed Stair (despite frequent references to 
Civil Law analyses in terms of procuratio) viewed assignation as the paradigm 
form of transfer.83
F. PURCHASERS AND CREDITORS
“As to bona fi des, although male fi des may cut down a right, bona fi des cannot 
establish a right”.84 This principle is core: it is, George Gretton observes, part 
of property law’s DNA.85 How does Lord Rodger’s principle – that purchasers 
need to be in good faith though creditors do not86 – fi t this analysis? What is the 
difference between a creditor and purchaser? Suppose Stuart Seller contracts to 
sell property to Brian Buyer. At this point there are reciprocal obligations: Stuart 
to transfer, and Brian to pay. These obligations are discharged, contingently, by 
performance: the disposition is delivered and the money is paid.87 By virtue of the 
missives, Brian may well be characterised as a “purchaser”. But as soon as that 
82 Bell v Gartshore (1737) Mor 2,848, 5 Br Sup 198, 2 Ross LC 410, discussed by Lord Rodger in Burnett’s 
Tr v Grainger 2004 SC (HL) 19 at para 113.
83 Stair, Inst 1.1.23.
84 Mitchells v Ferguson (1781) Mor 10,296, 3 Ross LC 120, Hailes 879 at 880 per Lord Justice-Clerk 
Braxfi eld. This dictum mirrored counsel’s submissions: 3 Ross LC 120 at 123. Francis Jeffrey colourfully 
sketched the nature of the principle in his powerful and eloquent submissions for the pursuer in the 
important, but anonymous, case reported only by R Bell, Report of a Case of Legitimacy under a Puta-
tive Marriage, tried before the Second Division of the Court of Session, February 1811 (1825) 41: “In 
all cases it has been shown, that bona fi des, however strong, cannot create or give any right whatever. It 
may keep alive what has been struck with a mortal wound, but it cannot raise from the dead or bring into 
existence what did not exist before”. The Second Division divided equally and the case then settled. One 
of the judges Jeffrey did persuade was Lord Newton, who stated (at 168): “[Bona fi des] may be a good 
plea against male fi des, but it cannot alter the true rights of the parties. It cannot make white black, nor 
black white, right wrong nor wrong right”. Powerful as Jeffrey’s submissions were, he met his match in 
junior counsel for the defender, his close friend, Thomas Thomson. There is much to be learned from 
the submissions of counsel in this case, which are a joy to read. In Menzies v Menzies (1863) 1 M 1025 
at 1037, Lord Neaves described the plea of bona fi des as “a shield and not a sword. It is not meant to 
injure the other party, but to protect the party pleading it…”
85 G L Gretton, “Equitable ownership in Scots law?” (2001) 5 EdinLR 73 at 76 n 23.
86 Burnett’s Tr v Grainger 2004 SC (HL) 19 at para 144. See C. above.
87 The content of the seller’s obligation has never been properly focussed. Is it to deliver a disposition? 
Burnett had done so. If delivery of a disposition is the sum total of the seller’s obligation, then Burnett 
discharged his obligation on delivery. On the seller’s insolvency, on this analysis, the buyer who fails to 
register would not only lose the price and the house but would have no claim in the seller’s sequestration. 
This cannot be correct. The contract, therefore, is for the transfer of the real right of ownership. If trans-
fer is prevented for reasons attributable to the seller – such as the seller’s sequestration or inconsistent 
disposition – a claim for breach of the missives arises. 
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contract comes into existence, Brian Buyer is no longer just a purchaser. He also 
becomes a creditor. Indeed, a creditor, by defi nition, is the holder of a personal 
right.88 All purchasers are creditors.89 And a purchaser is a creditor who can use 
diligence: indeed, the use of diligence – by adjudication in implement90 – was once 
a common method of implementing the missives. Where does this leave Lord 
Rodger’s principle? On the one hand the purchaser, qua purchaser, must be in 
good faith; on the other, the purchaser, qua creditor, need not be. Put another way, 
Lord Rodger’s principle – that purchasers must be in good faith, creditors need 
not be – discriminates against those creditors who happen to be purchasers. The 
distinction, long discernible in the sources, is illogical and unhelpful. Separating 
the position of purchasers from creditors does not assist in analysis of the role of 
good faith in transfer. 
The reason is simple: good faith is for the law of contract not the law of transfer. 
The so-called “offside goals rule” has been extended beyond sensible boundaries. 
Good faith is only relevant at the moment of contract. Privileges may be accorded 
to the good faith purchaser. Purchase – sale – is a contract. As Stair pointed out, 
knowledge (of any sort) acquired after conclusion of the contract is not relevant;91 
while anterior knowledge must be certain: private knowledge is also probably 
irrelevant.92 Provided the buyer is in good faith when he enters into the contract,93 
his position may not be attacked thereafter. After conclusion of the missives, the 
88 This was the whole point of Burnett’s Tr: The Graingers could not claim the property because they did 
not have a real right. As matters stood, the Graingers were in the invidious position of an unsecured 
creditor – hence the action. A heritable creditor may have a subordinate real right, but that real right 
must be held in security of a debt.
89 Of course, not all creditors are purchasers. 
90 Adjudication in implement is merely a “judicial disposition to supply the voluntary disposition promised” 
(Stair, Inst 4.51.9). An adjudication in implement will found an application for registration in the Land 
Register: A Rennie and I Davis (eds), Registration of Title Practice Book, 2nd edn (2000) para 6.50. See 
Rules of the Court of Session 1994, form 13.2-B(21) for a style conclusion for adjudication in imple-
ment. Neither heritable creditors nor other competitors are entitled to lodge defences to an action of 
adjudication in implement. For sheriff court procedure, see Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1907 s 5A.
91 Inst 1.14.5, 4.40.21. See generally, Anderson (n 19). 
92 Inst 2.1.24. See too T M Taylor, “Bona et Male Fides”, in Lord Dunedin et al (eds), Encyclopaedia of 
the Laws of Scotland (1927) vol 2 para 675: “Mere uncertainty is not suffi cient to induce male fi des and 
generally there must be some sort of legal interpellation (J Rankine, The Law of Landownership in 
Scotland, 4th edn (1909) 81). In some cases, bona fi des had been held to cease from the date of citation 
in an action in which the defender’s grounds of belief are contradicted or challenged, but in general 
bona fi des will not be held to cease till after the fi rst judgement setting it aside has been pronounced, 
provided this judgment stands without being altered through the various stages of the litigation. In cases 
where the point is attended with diffi culty, bona fi des will not be held to cease till the ultimate judgment 
setting it aside has been pronounced (Cleghorn v Elliot (1842) 4 D 1389).” With respect, Lord Rodger’s 
approval of Alex Brewster & Sons Ltd v Caughey 2002 GWD 15-506 in Burnett’s Tr v Grainger 2004 
SC (HL) 19 at para 142 was not only incorrect but also inconsistent with his own decision in that case. 
Cf R Wintgen, Etude critique de la notion d’opposabilité (2004) 212-213. 
93 This may be problematic where, as is the regrettable modern practice, missives take weeks to conclude. 
Is good faith required throughout? 
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purchaser is a creditor. And, as Lord Rodger rightly concluded, creditors need not 
be in good faith. 
G. GRATUITOUS TRANSFEREES
Perhaps Lord Rodger meant that all creditors except purchasers are relieved of 
the requirement of good faith. “Purchase” and “credit” imply onerosity. Suppose, 
then, there is good faith but no consideration? Normally a transfer for no consid-
eration may be subsequently impugned irrespective of the bona fi des of the trans-
feree in the event that the transferor becomes insolvent. But is good faith relevant? 
A purchaser, having provided consideration, must, in addition, show good faith. 
What of a donee? One would not expect a donee to be in a better position than a 
purchaser. If the donation is spontaneous, i.e. there is no prior promise to make it, 
the answer, on Lord Rodger’s analysis, remains elusive. But suppose Davey Donor 
promises to give Rima Lucrativa his house. The obligation is reduced to writing. 
Davey has undertaken a binding legal obligation which Rima can enforce. In other 
words, though a donee, Rima is also a creditor. Even if Rima subsequently learns 
that Davey had already promised to give the house to another, Rima is a creditor 
and she can adjudge in implement.94
H. REVERSING HERITABLE REVERSIONARY?
The decision of the House of Lords in Heritable Reversionary Co Ltd v Miller95 
sits, at best, uneasily with the general principles of Scots property law. It may be 
that the decision is no longer consistent even with the English law on which it was 
based, for English law has since embraced the mandatory publicity of land rights.96 
Heritable Reversionary, on the other hand, disregards the publicity principle. The 
94 In Laurie v Laurie (1854) 16 D 860, the pursuer failed to record before the seller’s bankruptcy. The 
pursuer sought to enforce this jus ad rem by adjudication in implement, an action the Second Division 
peremptorily refused. Lord Justice-Clerk Hope remarked (at 863) that he “was sorry to see the point 
disturbed at all…the deed founded on… is nothing more than a good personal obligation. The pursuer 
acknowledges this by adopting the form of adjudication in implement and unless we reverse the whole 
law, we cannot hold that the right can compete with the statutory right of the trustee”.
95 (1892) 19 R (HL) 43.The facts were these. A property investment company acquired land. The manager 
of the company took title in his own name but subsequently executed a declaration of trust in favour of 
the company. The trust was not, however, recorded in the Register of Sasines. The manager then became 
bankrupt. His trustee in sequestration took the view that the property fell into the sequestration; the 
company argued the property was held in trust and should not be divided among the general creditors. 
The property was sold and the proceeds consigned. The Court of Session held that a latent trust of land 
could not prejudice creditors and so the proceeds should be distributed pari passu. The House of Lords 
reversed: the trustee held under a “bare trust” and the company was the “benefi cial owner” of the land. 
The entire proceeds were therefore given to the company. 
96 See B Rudden and F H Lawson, The Law of Property, 3rd edn (2002) 104.
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benefi cial interest theory97 Lord Watson sought to introduce into Scots law has 
its origins in Equity. The very existence of Equity as a separate system of law is 
barely consistent with publicity. Equitable rights tend to be latent rights. The 
tantum et tale doctrine attempts to give effect to such latent rights. But a system, 
like Scots law, that has for so long been jealous of publicising land rights cannot 
tolerate a principle like Heritable Reversionary. In Burnett’s Tr, Lords Hoffmann 
and Hobhouse were absolutely correct to highlight the Heritable Reversionary 
anomaly.98 In elevating the exception to a rule, however, they drew the wrong 
conclusion. The only way to deal with the Heritable Reversionary doctrine is to 
extirpate it. 
But, if that is correct, how are trusts to be accommodated? Two points can be 
made about the effect of Burnett’s Tr on trusts. The fi rst is one of general principle. 
In Heritable Reversionary it was said that personal creditors of the trustee cannot 
attach trust property because they take tantum et tale.99 This is insuffi cient. If 
creditors do not need to be in good faith post-Burnett, then diligence creditors 
would not be affected by a trustee’s latent personal obligation to a benefi ciary. 
But this does not mean that personal creditors can now attach trust property. 
The explanation lies in the doctrinal basis of the law of trusts. Trust assets are not 
attachable by the trustee’s personal creditors because trust assets are held in a 
different patrimony. The trustee’s private creditors may only attach assets which 
are held in the trustee’s private patrimony.100 That is the general principle. To this 
extent, therefore, Burnett’s Tr is welcome. For it fortifi es the patrimony theory as 
a doctrinal basis of the trust in Scots law, a theory long discernible in the Scottish 
sources which has been well articulated by George Gretton101 and taken up by 
the Scottish Law Commission.102 That said, however, the principles of trust law 
must yield to legal policy. Owners of land who hold as trustees should publicise 
the nature of their holding on the register. If they do so, trust law can prevail; if 
not – and despite the decision in Heritable Reversionary – trust law cannot. Third 
parties cannot be prejudiced by a benefi ciary’s latent right. So, where trusts of 
land are kept secret, it should be possible for the trustee’s personal creditors to do 
diligence against the land; and, if the trustee becomes insolvent, the land should 
97 The theory even found its way into the order issued by the House ([1892] AC 598 at 625): “…declared 
that the subjects in question did not pass to the respondents, and that the appellants, as benefi cial 
owners, are entitled to the sum consigned in Bank” (emphasis added).
98 Burnett’s Trs (n 13) at paras 6-7 and at para 53 respectively.
99 (1892) 19 R (HL) 43
100 See Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 s 33. 
101 See in particular G L Gretton, “Trusts without equity” (2000) 49 ICLQ 599. 
102 Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper on The Nature and Constitution of Trusts (Scot Law Com 
DP No 133, 2006) paras 2.16-2.28.
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fall into the trustee’s sequestration.103 
The second point is a specifi c one. Suppose a trustee conveys in breach of 
trust. The grantee is protected unless he is in bad faith or took gratuitously.104 If 
the transferee gave value, the benefi ciaries are protected: the consideration, by 
real subrogation, will be held in the trust patrimony. Subject to one exception, 
the obligation of a bad faith transferee to retransfer property in his possession is 
indefi nite. It will never prescribe.105
I. RELIANCE ON THE REGISTER
Why are bona fi de purchasers given such favourable treatment? In Burnett’s Tr, 
Lord Rodger opened his analysis with an account of the historical development 
of the law:106
At an early stage it was accepted that bona fi de purchasers were not affected by personal 
rights of the seller which were not recorded in the register. After all, such purchasers 
could be taken to have consulted the register and to have proceeded on the informa-
tion about the seller’s title to be found there. The same could be said of creditors who 
insisted on the debtor providing them with a heritable security. Both groups transacted 
on the faith of the register. But, it was argued, creditors who used adjudication to obtain 
a security over their debtor’s property were different. They had originally chosen to lend 
money or to transact with the debtor either without taking any security at all or else on 
the basis of a personal security, such as caution from a third party. At all events, these 
creditors had not relied on the debtor’s land for security and had not therefore relied 
on his title to the land as set out in the register. So, if it turned out that the debtor had 
entered into personal obligations relating to the land, such creditors could not claim 
to have been misled by the unqualifi ed nature of his title in the deeds recorded in the 
register. If they proceeded to adjudge their debtor’s property, there was therefore no 
reason why they should be in any better position than the debtor himself on whom they 
had chosen to rely: they should take his property tantum et tale, subject to any personal 
103 This whole issue is under consideration by the Scottish Law Commission: see Discussion Paper on The 
Nature and Constitution of Trusts paras 4.29 ff.
104 Trusts (Scotland) Act 1961 s 2. Admittedly s 2 does not require good faith or consideration, but the 
residual, common law, offside goals rule does. It should be emphasised that third parties who take 
an assignation in breach of trust are not protected by s 2. Assignations by trustees are covered by the 
Trusts (Scotland) Act 1921 s 4(1)(h). Section 2 of the 1961 Act, however, does not cover s 4(1)(h) of 
the 1921 Act. But onerous assignations are protected by the decision in Redfearn v Sommervail (1813) 
1 Dow 50.  
105 Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 Sch 3 para (f). The exception relates to assignations in 
breach of trust. Only the obligation to re-transfer property in the transferee’s possession is imprescrip-
tible. The objects of assignation are claims, not things. And claims, at least in this writer’s view, cannot 
be possessed: they are incorporeal. This leads to the conclusion that an obligation to retrocess a claim 
procured by fraud can prescribe. Cf Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 s 55(2)(c): a bankrupt will never 
be discharged from obligations arising from his fraudulent acts.
106 Burnett’s Tr v Grainger 2004 SC (HL) 19 at para 112. For the views of one of the major proponents 
of this approach, see the opinion of Lord McLaren in Heritable Reversionary Co Ltd v Miller (1891) 
18 R 1166.
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obligations, including obligations to uninfeft purchasers, that affected his right to the 
property. So ran the argument that was eventually to fail – but only after a valiant fi ght 
by its proponents.
To say that only purchasers rely on the register is as unrealistic as attempts to draw 
a distinction between creditors and purchasers are artifi cial.107 The register is there 
for all to see.108 The register may be consulted and relied upon for any number of 
reasons of which purchase may be but one. In any event, the purchaser who has 
checked the register has acted properly. A purchaser is affected by what is on the 
register, by some off-register real rights,109 and by some statutory rights.110 Personal 
rights, whatever their basis, are a different matter. To allow latent personal rights 
to affect ownership of land is inconsistent with the rationale underlying registra-
tion. The tantum et tale doctrine is attractive to litigators: anything and everything 
becomes arguable. But endless litigation, and the uncertainty and expense which 
that engenders, is not something which the law of transfer ought to endure.111 
Where the asset is a personal right, there is no register to consult. But the same 
principles apply. Latent fourth party rights (or, indeed, the extrinsic defences held 
by the debitor cessus) cannot affect onerous transferees. Similarly, latent fourth 
party rights or extrinsic defences cannot affect creditors. Trusts do not fi t neatly 
into the doctrinal analysis, for they are often latent and normally constituted in a 
document extrinsic to a personal right which creditors may seek to arrest. But the 
law is clear. If there is a trust, then, all other things being equal, the trust must be 
given effect. Consequently, claims which the common debtor holds in trust are not 
available to the common debtor’s personal creditors. 
107 Cf Lindsay v Webster (1841) 4 D 231 at 234 per Lord Moncreiff. 
108 Unlike, for example, in German law, where a “legitimate interest” is necessary (Grundbuchordnung 
§ 12: “Die Einsicht des Grundbuchs ist jedem gestattet, der ein berechtigtes Interesse darlegt...”). In 
modern Scots law, it must be conceded, while anyone can look, all there is to see is the title sheet.
109 In particular, short leases and servitudes.
110 See R R M Paisley, “Real rights: practical problems and dogmatic rigidity” (2005) 9 EdinLR 267.
111 Cf Hastie and Jamieson v Arthur (1770) Hailes 381 per Lord Pitfour: “It is a rule as old as the Romans 
and adopted by every commercial nation – traditionibus, non nudis pactis, dominia transferuntur. 
Every nation will deal confi dently with us if that be the rule: but otherwise no nation will trust us. 
Every private hypothec must be ruinous. It is said that an arrester cannot take a subject but tantum 
et tale as in the debtor: Does that imply that all the latent obligations of the debtor go along with the 
subject? The proof is not relevant. Merchants, who have lost by trusting to consignments, will be of one 
opinion: merchants who have prevailed upon arrestments, will be of another, – for every man thinks 
his own cause is right. I would require the judgment of courts or the opinion of writers, that such is the 
established practice: but nothing of this kind is offered.” It must be observed, of course, that English 
law does not seem to have suffered from its ready willingness to equate an agreement to transfer to an 
executed transfer. See too J van den Sande, De Actionum Cessione (transl P C Anders as Commentary 
on Cession of Actions, 1906) 240.
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J. CONCLUSIONS
“Words are not spells, though spells may be in words”.112 The words “tantum et 
tale” carry no magic but their effect has often been mystical: one party, otherwise 
unsecured, ends up running away with a proportion of the bankrupt’s assets to the 
prejudice of the general body of creditors. To concede a preference in a hard case 
of “fraud” is to fail to treat like cases alike:113 for which unsatisfi ed creditor has 
not been treated harshly?114 Hardship is hardship is hardship; but “an argument 
does not gain force in proportion to the vehemence with which it is uttered”.115 
Insolvency is manifestly unfair: hence the principle of paritas creditorum. It is not 
for the faint-hearted. Hard decisions must be made. Meekly according a prefer-
ence to the party who shouts loudest is no basis for a law of competition. While 
a legal system may adopt an incremental approach to the division of assets on 
insolvency,116 this is not Scots law: “It is a rule established, beyond all memory, that 
there are no equities in competitions among creditors”.117 Burnett’s Tr focuses the 
issues. Claimants reciting the tantum et tale mantra can no longer expect to make 
off with assets that should be distributed pari passu. 
112 T Weir, “Diffi culties in transposing directives” (2004) Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 595 at 
611.
113 Cf D N MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, 2nd edn (1994).
114 See, above all, G L Gretton, “Ownership and insolvency” (2004) 8 EdinLR 389.
115 Attributed to Sir Henry de Villiers by G A Mulligan, “Bellum juridicum (3): purists, pollutionists and 
pragmatists” (1952) 69 SALJ 25, and accentuated by J S Scholtens, “Diffi ciles nugae: once again double 
sales” (1954) 71 SALJ 71 at 86.
116 Cf S Worthington, “Integrating Equity and the Common Law” (2002) 55 CLP 223 at 237.
117 Mansfi eld v Walker’s Tr (1833) 11 S 813 at 828 per Lord Craigie. See also Duke of Norfolk v Annui-
tants of York Buildings Co (1752) Mor 7,062; Kames Sel Dec 1; Elchies, Competition No 12 per Lord 
Kames in his title on the contents page. This approach is preferable to that of Lord President Inglis in 
Taylor v Charteris & Andrew (1879) 7 R 128 at 131. In Raymond Harrison & Co’s Tr v North Western 
Securities 1989 SLT 718 and Burnett’s Tr v Grainger 2002 SC 580, arguments based on equity were 
rejected by Lord Clyde and the Inner House respectively.
ELR11_2_04_Anderson.indd   207 20/4/07   16:13:29
